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Abstract 
Are women the superheroes of the corporate world? The increasing number of women 
directors coupled with the various policies and quotas in favor of boards’ gender diversity 
have given rise to extensive research on women directorship. This study investigates the 
impact of boards’ gender diversity on firm performance and firm risk. Relying on 136 
FTSE100 companies and 11 years of data, this study finds evidence that gender diversity 
enhances corporate outcomes. Gender diversity within the executive directors’ team is 
associated with an increase in corporate performance and a decrease in corporate risk. 
However, no impact had been identified regarding gender diversity within the non-executive 
board of directors. The results convey the benefits of women participation in the executive 
suite and demonstrate the positive impact of boards’ gender diversity on corporate 
outcomes. As such, this study highlights women leadership potential that is being hindered 












"If Lehman Brothers had been Lehman Sisters, today’s economic crisis clearly would look 
quite different." — Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the International Monetary 
Fund. 
 
"We need women at all levels, including the top, to change the dynamic, reshape the 
conversation, to make sure women's voices are heard and heeded, not overlooked and 
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Resumo 
As mulheres serão os superherois do mundo corporativo? O numero crescente de mulheres 
em cargos diretivos, e o aumento de politicas e cotas a favor da diversificação do genero no 
board of directors tem levado ao aumento de estudos sobre a liderança das mulheres. Este 
estudo investiga o impacto que a diversidade do genero tem na performance da empresa 
como no risco da mesma. Tendo por base 136 FTSE 100 empresas e 11 anos de dados, este 
estudo encontra evidencia de que a diversidade do genero melhore os resultados da empresa. 
A diversidade de genero dentro de directores executivos está associada com um aumento da 
performance da empresa e uma diminuição no risco da mesma. Contudo nenhum impacto 
tem sido notado em cargos não executivos. Os resultados demonstram os beneficios da 
participação de mulheres em cargos executivos e demonstra o impacto positivo que a 
inserção de mulheres tem no board of directors. Desta forma este estudo evidencia o 
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I. Introduction  
In a male dominated corporate hierarchy, women’s access to top management positions is 
slowly progressing. Despite this progress, while women make up nearly half the global 
population, they only represent 20% of global senior leadership positions (Grant Thornton, 
2015). Gender diversity on boards is recurrently at the center of the academia, press and 
political agendas. At the wake of corporate scandals and economic crises, governments are 
increasingly seeking a gender balance. Thus, a number of countries have instituted quota-
legislations in an effort to increase women’s presence on the boards of directors. In 2003, 
Norway was the first country to establish a quota of 40% with a strict sanction: dissolve and 
fine companies until compliance. Nine other countries subsequently instituted legally binding 
quotas ranging from 33% to 50%. These countries include Spain, Québec (Canada), and 
France. Other countries adopted less drastic policies through instituting non-legally binding 
quotas in their corporate governance codes (Terjesen et al., 2015). In total, 32 countries have 
encouraged women representation on boards through policies ranging from disclosure 
requirements, to legally binding quotas between 2008 and 2015 (Adams, 2016). These political 
actions are not only for the sake of gender equality, but also for the good of the corporations. 
 Are women the Superheroes of the corporate world? The male dominance in the boards 
of the financial sector known as the “old boy’s networks” gave rise to an interesting hypothesis 
that is being debated: “The Lehman Sisters Hypothesis” (Adams and Ragunathan, 2015; van 
Staveren, 2014). The underlying assumption of the “The Lehman Sisters Hypothesis” debate is 
that if more women would have been on boards, the Lehman Brothers scandal could have been 
avoided. Van Staveren (2014) reports that this view is shared and explicitly expressed by many 
policy makers and politicians including Neelie Kroes and Viviane Reding (EU commissioners), 
Christine Lagarde (Managing director of the IMF) and, Harriet Harman (former UK Minister). 
As a result, researchers have been extensively investigating the impact of women leadership on 
corporations. Work on gender-diversity falls under two broad aspects: corporate performance 
and corporate risk taking. Both literature streams did not reach a consensus to date.  
In some studies, female executive and non-executive board members are found to have a 
positive impact on firms’ performance. Some suggest that female CEOs are associated to 
higher ROAs (Peni, 2014; Krishnan and Park, 2005). Other authors associate the proportion of 
female executive directors with corporate value creation (Davis et al., 2010; Smith et al. 2006). 
Higher percentages of non-executive board members are also found to enhance corporate 
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performance (Erhardt et al., 2003; Carter et al., 2010).  However, contradicting findings also 
arise in the literature associating women CEOs and executive directors to negative corporate 
outcomes (Darmadi, 2013; Lee and James 2007). Other authors stress the negative impact of 
gender quotas in Norway (Bøhren and Strøm, 2010; Ahern and Dittmar, 2012). The literature 
also includes studies that report insignificant results between women directors and firms’ 
performance (Randøy et al., 2006; Francoeur et al., 2008). 
Research on boards’ gender-diversity impact on corporate risk taking is also 
characterized by contrasting findings. Women are perceived as risk averse compared to their 
male counterparts in non-managerial contexts; however, it is unclear whether this proclaimed 
and generally accepted gender stereotype applies to the managerial population (Hudgens and 
Fatkin, 1985; Johnson and Powell, 1994; Croson and Gneezy; 2009). Some studies report that 
female CEOs are more conservative towards debts and acquisitions (Frank and Goyal, 2007; 
Huang and Kisgen, 2013). Women executive directors adopt a prudent approach when facing 
risky decisions which results in shareholders’ value creation (Levi et al., 2014; Perryman et al., 
2016). Regarding non-executive directors, women are perceived as tougher monitors who 
would scrutinize risky and fraudulent activity (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Their proportion as 
non-executive directors is characterized by a decrease in corporate risk and variability of firms’ 
returns (Levi et al., 2014; Hutchison et al., 2015).  
In fact, female directors are rarely associated to an increase in corporate leverage. 
Instances in the literature are skewed toward the finance industry, where women are found to 
be less risk averse than women in other sectors (Sapienza et al., 2009). In a study limited to the 
banking sector, women executives are found to increase portfolio risk (Berger et al., 2014). 
Other authors do not document differences among male and female directors relative to risk 
aversion. Empirical studies and surveys report that the risk aversion of women directors is 
comparable to that of their male counterparts (Maxfield et al., 2010; Atkinson et al., 2003). A 
study on the impact of Norway’s gender quota finds no change in firms’ leverage upon the 
implementation of the 40% female representation on boards (Matsa and Miller, 2013). The 
Lehman Sisters hypothesis was rejected upon studying US banks risk taking around the 
financial crisis time period (Adams and Ragunathan, 2015).   
Motivated by the contradicting findings in the literature relative to women directors’ 
impact on corporate outcomes, this thesis studies the impact of women executive and non-
executive directors on the risk and performance of firms. The impact of female leadership on 
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corporate outcomes is continuously scrutinized and judged making it even more challenging for 
the latter to climb senior management positions. Therefore, in line with Perryman et al. (2016) 
among others, this thesis considers women’s impact on corporate outcomes in aggregate terms 
as part of the top management teams. As opposed to focusing on gender-based differences, the 
impact of boards’ gender diversity is studied as a synergy. Given women’s underrepresentation 
on boards, most of the studies do not disaggregate executives from the board of directors in 
empirical studies (McCann and wheeler, 2011). However, this thesis distinguishes between 
these corporate subpopulations that are characterized by different duties and roles. Using a 
sample of FTSE100 corporations, this thesis reports a significant positive link between female 
executives and performance, and a significant negative link between female executives and 
corporate risk. However, no significant impact is documented when it comes to the impact of 
female non-executive directors. 
The next section provides a review of the main findings in the literature. Section III 
presents the data and methodology used in this study. Section IV details the results of the 
empirical study in two distinct subsections: Female Directors & Corporate Performance and 
Female Directors & Corporate Risk. Section V provides a brief discussion of the results 
followed by section VI which outlines the limitations and suggests further research areas. 
Section VII concludes the study. 
II. Literature Review 
1. Women in Leadership  
Corporate leadership positions have been traditionally and historically held by men. The 
glass ceiling is a metaphor commonly used to describe invisible barriers preventing women to 
access leadership positions. Taste-based discrimination and child-related decisions are 
instances of these barriers (Adams and Kirchmaier, 2013).  Even when they manage to attain 
top senior positions, women still face many barriers ranging from unequal pay to lack of peer 
mentoring as opposed to their male counterparts (Matsa and Miller, 2013; Perryman et al., 
2016). Nevertheless, women have made a tremendous progress breaking through this glass and 
are increasingly accessing executive and non-executive positions. To anticipate the potential 
impact of gender diversity on corporate boards, many scholars attempt to identify the 
characteristics of female managers. 
The unique set of skills that characterizes women is a common argument in favor of 
gender diversity on boards. Some scholars report that women would bring different 
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perspectives originating from their different experiences, values and thinking (Adams and 
Ferreira, 2009; Post and Byron, 2014). Other studies document that female attributes and 
interpersonal skills are preferred for leadership positions during times of crisis (Haslam et al, 
2010). Women board-members are found to exhibit better attendance rates and higher 
involvement in the monitoring process compared their male counterparts (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009). Women managers are found to have different strategic approaches than men managers. 
Female managers are described as more interactive and process-oriented as opposed to men 
who are more transactional and outcome-oriented (Johansen, 2007).   
When it comes to the impact of gender diversity on corporate risk, women are widely 
documented to be more risk averse than their male counterparts in psychological and 
experimental research (Barber and Odean, 2011; Byrnes et al., 1999). Barber and Odean (2011) 
attribute women risk aversion to the fact that they are less overconfident than their male 
counterpart. However, Deaves et al. (2008) finds no differences between male and female 
traders, and no evidence of a higher male overconfidence. It is unclear whether the risk 
aversion stereotype applies to the managerial population (Croson and Gneezy, 2009). Women 
in Swedish corporate boards are reported to be more risk loving (Adams and Funk, 2012). 
Women in the financial industry are found to be less risk averse than women in other industries 
(Sapienza et al., 2009). Nelson (2016) performs a meta-analysis of 37 published studies. After 
pooling the data and performing robustness checks, the author concludes that there is no 
evidence for large differences among men and women in risk aversion. In fact, Nelson (2016) 
finds evidence of a confirmation bias. This bias constitutes the tendency to seek results that 
confirm prior expectations. Maxfield et al. (2010) assert that the generally accepted stereotype 
of women risk aversion, limits the benefits their added value as managers. The stereotypes and 
generalizations about women directors are dangerous as they would most likely influence the 
recruitment process of female candidates. 
Not all women are the same; “female leadership traits” are not universal. Assessing the 
impact of gender diversity based on the observed trends in women management style and 
feminine characteristics might be misleading. Therefore, this thesis investigates the impact of 
diversity in aggregate terms in line with Perryman et al. (2016). Findings from empirical 
studies investigating the impact of gender diversity on corporate outcomes are summarized in 
the next sections.  
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2. Board diversity and Corporate Performance 
Researchers have extensively investigated the link between the presence of women on 
boards and the financial performance of firms. This section summarizes some of the findings 
and presents opposing views on this topic. 
Relying on a sample of S&P500 firms, Peni (2014) finds that firms led by female CEOs 
produce higher ROAs. Consistent with these findings, Krishnan and Park (2005) document a 
positive impact of women executives on corporate performance measured by the ROA. Smith 
et al. (2006) rely on a sample of 2500 Danish companies and report an average positive effect 
of executives on the corporate performance. Using a sample of small service businesses, Davis 
et al. (2010) find that female CEOs outperform their male counterparts. Huang and Kisgen 
(2013) also report that men underperformed women executives by 2% in terms of returns 
announcements following acquisitions.  
Erhardt et al. (2003) and Carter et al. (2003) document a positive impact of the board 
diversity on companies’ financial performance. Erhardt et al. (2003) use a sample of the 127 
largest American companies from 1993 to 2002. They rely on ROA and Tobin’s Q as 
performance measures and the percentage of women and minorities on boards as a gender 
indicator. Carter et al. (2003) use a larger sample of 638 Fortune 1000 firms and adopts Tobin’s 
Q as a proxy for the firm value. Both studies reported the positive impact of boards’ diversity 
on the financial performance.  
Adler (2001) uses a sample of Fortune 500 companies over the time period between 1980 
and 1998. The author confirms that the presence of women on the 20 highest positions in the 
company is associated to high profits. Liu et al. (2014) investigate the impact of boards’ 
diversity in emerging markets. Using a sample of Chinese companies, they conclude that a 
higher percentage of women on boards is associated to a superior corporate performance.  
Weber and Zulehner (2010) find consistent results when studying the impact of women 
directors in an especially dynamic corporate environment: Start ups. This study is motivated by 
the fact that start-ups are especially sensitive to managerial decision making. As startups are 
new entities, this study overcomes reverse causality issues in the sense that results are not 
biased by past performance.   
Francoeur et al. (2008) use an innovative approach to measure firms’ financial 
performance while controlling for risk: they rely on firms’ betas, market-to-book ratios and 
12 
 
analysts’ forecasts standard deviation. They report that gender diversity among the executive 
team results in positive and abnormal returns and higher ROE.   
One of the most cited studies in this topic is the Catalyst (2004) that reports a strong 
positive link between gender diversity and financial performance using a sample of 352 
Fortune 500 companies over a period extending from 1996 to 2000. This study measures 
performance using ROE and companies’ stock returns. The report asserts that the presence of 
women on boards enhances firms’ performance. The same organization follows up with 
another study in Catalyst (2007) and confirms its previous findings using a sample of 520 
Fortune 500 companies including leavers and joiners and adding more financial indicators such 
as the ROIC. Schrader, Blackburn and Iles (1997) study a sample of 200 Fortune 500 
companies and find a positive link between the percentage of women on boards and firms’ 
performance. 
Conversely, other researchers report a negative relationship between the percentage of 
women on boards and firms’ financial performance. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) and Bøhren and 
Strøm (2010) report a negative impact of women representation on the corporate performance 
of Norwegian companies. Ahern and Dittmar (2012) study the impact of the 40% female 
director quota that was imposed in Norway. Their study demonstrates that the increase in 
women representation on boards has a negative impact on the corporate performance. They 
attribute these findings to the fact that the rush to recruit female directors might have resulted in 
the selection of inexperienced and inadequate female representation. Bøhren and Strøm (2010) 
also link female representation with a lower firm value creation. Put in context, their study 
focuses on Norwegian firms and stresses the shortcomings of the imposed quota of female 
presence on boards. Consistent with Ahern and Dittmar (2012), the authors find that Norway’s 
quotas could be ineffective as this pressured recruitment process might result in an ineffective 
recruitment process. Although these studies are specific to Norway’s quota conditions, they 
represent important findings in the literature, and question whether quotas are an effective way 
to increase gender diversity on boards.  
In the corporate governance literature, Adams and Ferreira (2007) report that excessive 
monitoring has a negative impact on firm value. In Adams and Ferreira (2009) the authors 
found an average negative effect of boards’ gender diversity on firms’ performance and 
associate it to women directors over engaging in monitoring activities in well governed firms. 




Finally, numerous studies did not identify any link between gender diversity on boards 
and the performance of firms. Randøy et al. (2006) rely on a European sample of the largest 
500 companies from Denmark, Norway and Sweden and demonstrate that female presence on 
boards does not have a significant effect on financial performance. Rose (2007) uses a sample 
of Danish companies over the period extending from 1998 to 2001 and reports insignificant 
results about this link as well. Carter et al. (2010) test the effect of both gender and racial 
diversity of board members. The financial performance is measured by Tobin’s Q and ROA 
relying on a sample of the biggest S&P500 companies over a period of time extending from 
1998 to 2002. They do not find a significant relationship between board diversity and corporate 
performance. 
Most of the studies that investigate gender-diversity on boards do not disaggregate 
executives given the small proportion of women in the corporate directorship (McCann and 
Wheeler, 2011). When assessing women impact on corporate risk, this thesis distinguishes 
between three different functions: CEOs, executive and non-executive directors. 
3. Board Diversity and Corporate Risk  
A review of the literature provides mixed results when it comes to the impact of gender-
diversity on corporate risk taking. However, a general insight from the literature is that women 
representation in the boardroom decreases corporate risk. Either this holds true or simply 
emanates from data mining and confirmation biases, it is certainly among the expected 
outcomes of quotas and regulations that are being implemented all over the world to urge for 
women representation on boards. This section explores the findings related to the impact of 
gender diversity among executives and independent board members on the corporate risk 
taking. 
Most of the studies investigating the impact of CEOs’ gender on firms’ risk provide 
evidence of female CEOs risk aversion. Martin et al. (2009) conclude that the market perceives 
women CEOs as risk averse using an event study consisting of 70 announcements of women 
CEOs. Cole (2013) also reports that leverage is lower for female owned companies. Faccio et 
al. (2016) investigate the link between the presence of women on boards and the corporate risk 
of both public and private European companies. To measure risk they use three proxies: the 
first is leverage which they defined by the ratio of financial debt divided by the sum of 
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financial debt plus equity; the second is the volatility of ROA; the third is the likelihood of 
survival of the firm over a 5 years period. Their empirical results establish that firms run by 
female CEOs have a significantly lower risk. They also document a reduction in leverage 
associated with the transition from a male to a female CEO. 
Consistent with this idea, Frank and Goyal (2007) find that firms are less likely to issue 
debt when the CEO is a female. The authors stress the importance of the impact of managers’ 
fixed effects and their implications for a given firm. Huang and Kisgen (2013) examine the 
difference between female and male CEOs and CFOs. They find that women are more 
conservative when it comes to debt issuing and acquisitions.  
Other studies investigate the impact of women representation on boards. Women 
directors are reputed to be tougher monitors and have better attendance rates than their male 
counterparts (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Levi et al, 2014).  Levi et al. (2014) study a sample of 
US companies listed in the S&P1500 index (including S&P500, S&P400 and S&P600 small 
and midcap firms) over the time period from 1997 to 2009. Analyzing mergers and 
acquisitions, they report that female directors are considerably more conservative than their 
male counterparts. The authors conclude that: “each additional female director is associated 
with 7.6% fewer bids, and each additional female director on a bidder board reduces the bid 
premium paid by 15.4%” (Levi et al., 2014).  
Carter et al. (2015) find that women directors are more risk averse and conclude that this 
characteristic reduces firms’ overall risk. Perryman et al. (2016) reach a similar conclusion 
using a sample of 2454 US firms. Hutchinson et al. (2015) study the impact of women directors 
on 500 Australian companies and report that board gender diversity reduces firms’ risk. Lenard 
et al. (2014) find that women on boards decrease the variability of stock returns.  
In general, women are reported to be more informed and prudent when facing risky 
decisions (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Huang and Kisgen, 2013; Barber and Odean, 
2001).Therefore, studies that find that female presence on boards increases firms’ risk are less 
abundant in the literature. An instance is Adams and Funk (2012) who find that female Swedish 
directors are more risk loving compared to their male counterparts. Berger et al. (2014) report 
that bank portfolio risk increases with the increase of female executives on boards. Although 
their findings are only marginally significant, they attribute their results to the fact that female 
executives might be inexperienced compared to their male counterparts.  
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Another stream of literature reports no evidence of female impact on corporate risk. 
Gender based differences in risk aversion is the most prominent argument in favor of the 
inverse relationship between female directors and corporate risk. Croson and Gneezy (2009) 
suggest that it is misleading to generalize this fact to the corporate level. The authors provide a 
summary and analysis for 10 experimental studies concerning the difference in risk-aversion 
between women and men in non-managerial contexts. Upon performance of robustness checks 
of the 10 studies; they conclude that women are more risk averse than their male counterparts. 
However, they consider that managers are an “exception to the rule.” Hudgens and Fatkin 
(1985), Johnson and Powell (1994) and, Bruce and Johnson (1994) provide further evidence of 
differences in risk propensities between the managerial and non-managerial population. These 
authors conclude that gender based differences in risk aversion do not necessarily apply to the 
corporate level. 
 Maxfield et al. (2010) analyze a survey database of 661 female managers and find no 
evidence of gender related differences between men and women in risky managerial decision 
making. Atkinson et al. (2003) analyze mutual funds performance, and find that despite 
adopting different risk strategies male and female managed funds’ exhibit comparable risk and 
performance records. Matsa and Miller (2013) find no change in Norwegian firms’ leverage 
after the introduction of the 40% quota for women participation on boards. 
Using a sample of 2000 US firms from 1996 to 2010, Sila et al. (2016) investigate the 
relationship between the presence of women on boards and the equity risk and find no gender-
related differences. Motivated by the Lehman Sisters hypothesis, Adams and Ragunathan 
(2015) focus their study on 300 large publicly listed US banks over the time period around the 
financial crisis of 2007-2008. They find no evidence that gender diverse boards lead to more or 
less risky policies; however, they report that banks with more female managers perform better 
during the financial crisis. 
Most of the studies that investigate gender-diversity on boards do not disaggregate 
executives given the small proportion of women in the corporate directorship (McCann and 
Wheeler, 2011). When assessing women impact on corporate risk, this thesis distinguishes 
between three different functions: CEOs, executives and non-executive directors. 
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III. Data and Methodology 
1. Sample Description  
The chosen sample consists of 132 companies of the Financial Times Stock Exchange 
(FTSE) 100 index. Data on companies’ financial measures is extracted from Thomson Reuters 
Eikon database. The Balance Sheet and the Income Statement are extracted for each individual 
company to obtain the financial measures. Data on board-gender diversity is hand collected 
from annual reports issued by the University of Cranfield and sponsored by Barclays Bank 
among other influential institutions. This university issues annual reports since 1999 providing 
the number of women on the boards of the FTSE 100 constituents. The data time span is 11 
years from 2005 until 2015. As the index composition changes over time, only companies with 
at least three years of data are included. The final sample comprises 132 companies with data 
for at least three years from 2005 until 2015 and a total of 1016 observations. The next 
subsections detail all the variables that are used in the analysis. Appendix A comprises all the 
variables and their definitions. 
2. Variables  
2.1.  Dependent Variables 
 The corporate performance is defined using three measures as dependent variables: 
return on assets (ROA); return on equity (ROE); the ratio of operating income to the total assets 
(OI/TA). ROA is computed by dividing the net income over the total assets. ROE is computed 
by dividing the Net income over the Total equity. OI/TA is the ratio of the operating income 
over the total assets. The choice of these variables is consistent with studies investigating the 
effect of gender on boards’ performance. ROA and ROE are among the most commonly used 
metrics to reflect the profitability of firms (Shrader et al., 1997). Du Toit et al. (2007) identify 
these ratios among the favorite indicators of firms’ overall performance in the literature. ROA 
is used by Cole (2013), Carter et al. (2010) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) as a proxy for 
corporate performance. ROE is also a common profitability measure across the gender 
literature (Catalyst, 2007; Adams, 2016). Finally, the OI/TA performance measure is consistent 
with Frank and Goyal (2007) as well as Smith et al. (2006) among others. In fact, OI/TA is 
reported to be a suitable measure of firm’s productivity as it measures the earning power of 
assets (Altman, 1968). 
The corporate risk dependent variable is computed by dividing the total long term debt by 
the sum of the total equity and the total long-term debt (DED). This is also a common proxy for 
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risk in the literature on boards’ gender diversity (Faccio et al., 2016; Huang and Kisgen, 2013). 
This variable indicates the financial health of companies. Faccio et al. (2016) explain that given 
a negative shock, the higher this ratio, the stronger the impact of the shock on firms’ 
profitability. The intuition behind using this proxy is that a high leverage ratio is a signal for 
financial distress. Moreover, the leverage ratio approximates both the risk and the complexity 
of firms. In case of financial distress, firms are more inclined towards risky activities (Sila et 
al., 2016).  
2.2.  Independent Variables  
CEO is a dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the Chief Executive Officer is 
woman and 0 otherwise consistent with the literature (Martin et al., 2009; Faccio et al., 2016; 
Frank and Goyal, 2007; Huang and Kisgen, 2013). CEO/CFO is another dummy that takes the 
value 1 when the Chief Financial Officer or the Chief Executive Officer is a woman and 0 
otherwise. The relevance of the CFO is documented in the literature by Bertrand and Schoar 
(2003) who identify this position as decisive to the financial strategy of firms. In fact, CFOs are 
found to be as important as CEOs in the corporate decision making process (Huang and Kisgen, 
2013). CFO is a dummy that takes the value 1 to indicate the presence of a female Chief 
Financial Officer and 0 otherwise. Consistent with the literature, the CFO variable is only used 
in the risk regressions.  
The third gender variable (Executive) is a dummy that takes 1 if there is at least one 
female executive director sits on the board and 0 otherwise. CEO, CEO/CFO, and Executive 
are three independent variables meant to capture the impact of female executive directors on 
the financial performance and risk taking. 
The impact of the non-executive female directors on board is also investigated. Based on 
the literature, common measures of gender diversity include a dummy that takes 1 if there is at 
least one woman on the board and zero otherwise (Cole, 2013; Campbell and Minguez-Vera, 
2008). Therefore, Non-Executives is introduced as dummy that takes the value 1 if there is at 
least one woman non-executive director seats on the board. Other authors follow the critical 
mass theory: at least three women should belong to the board of directors in order to observe an 
impact on the corporations. These include Liu et al. (2014) who report that the presence of only 
one woman might not allow her to be influential. The intuition behind this reasoning is that 
women as a minority in top management would only have their voice heard once they reach a 
critical mass (Kristie, 2011). Following this reasoning, 3Non-Executives is an additional 
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dummy that takes the value 1 if at least 3 women non-executive directors belong to the board. 
In sum, to capture the impact of women in the non-executive team, two additional variables are 
included in the analysis: Non-Executives and 3Non-Executives.  
2.3. Control Variables 
Other variables are included to control for firms’ growth, complexity and lifecycle. The 
first control variable is the total asset growth (Growth) computed as the yearly percentage 
change in total assets. This variable allows controlling for the growth of the firm (Titman and 
Wessels, 1988). Guay (1999) suggests that firms with larger growth opportunities are more 
prone to engage in risky activities. On the other hand, Lipson et al. (2009) document that a 
higher asset growth signals lower risk taking activities. On the stock market literature, many 
authors find evidence of an asset growth effect on market returns. The asset growth effect 
suggests that firms with low (high) asset growth rates earn higher (lower) returns. Cooper et al. 
(2008) find that this effect is due to managerial overinvestment. Given the relevance of this 
measure and its links to risk, performance and corporate governance, Growth is computed as 
the total asset growth and is introduced as a control variable in the regressions.  
  FirmSize is computed as the natural logarithm of total assets to control for the size of 
the firms. Sila et al. (2016) among others, identify an inverse relationship between firms’ size 
the size of and corporate risk taking. Cole (2013) asserts that firms’ size is an important factor 
to take into account when assessing firms’ probability of financial distress. The rationale 
behind this reasoning is the difference in the access to the financing channels. It is generally 
easier for large firms to borrow from banks and access diverse sources of credit. Du Rietz and 
Henrekson (2000) find that if not controlling for firm size, women directors underperformed 
their male counterparts. However, once the firm size control variable is introduced, the 
significance of these results vanished. Therefore, FirmSize is introduced a second control 
variable in the regressions. 
FirmAge is the third control variable computed as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the 
years since incorporation of firms. This variable is commonly used in the literature to control 
for the life cycle of firms (Faccio et al., 2016; Sila et al., 2016). The intuition behind using this 
variable is that leverage and profitability vary across the firm’s life stage and maturity. 
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The fourth control variable is Tangibility computed as the ratio of fixed to total assets. 
This measure is consistently used in the gender literature to control for firms’ characteristics 
(Faccio et al. 2016; Cole, 2013). 
In the corporate governance literature, Conyon et al. (1998) suggest that a large board of 
directors destroys corporate value.  In a recent study, the size of boards is reported to have a 
negative impact on corporate performance using a sample of UK firms (Guest, 2009). 
Moreover, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that firms with smaller boards perform better. 
BoardSize is therefore introduced as a fifth control variable consistent with Huang and Kisgen 
(2013), Levi et al. (2014) and Sila et al. (2016) among others. The 5 aforementioned control 
variables are used in both corporate performance and risk regressions to control for firms’ 
characteristics.  
In the performance regressions the ratio of total long-term debt to total assets (Leverage) 
is also introduced as a control variable in addition to the five aforementioned variables 
FirmSize, FirmAge, Tangibility, BoardSize and Growth. In fact Leverage computed as the ratio 
of long-term debt to total assets is commonly used as a control variable when the dependent 
variable is a performance proxy such as ROA, ROE and OI/TA (Liu et al., 2014). Total long-
term debt over total assets is a ratio that controls for leverage and is expected to have a negative 
coefficient with profitability measures (Titman and Wessels, 1988). The variable (Leverage) is 
only used in the performance regressions and is not included in the risk regression analysis. 
In the risk taking regressions, OIG is computed as the yearly percentage change in the 
operating income and introduced in addition to the five control variables (FirmSize, FirmAge, 
Tangibility and BoardSize) control variables. Consistent with the literature, when the dependent 
variable is a risk proxy, one should control for profitability to account for differences in the 
management quality (Faccio et al., 2016).  OIG is only used in the risk regression and is not 
included in the performance regression analysis. 
3. Sample Description  
In Table 1, the descriptive statistics of the sample are reported. The sample is 
characterized by a low representation of women in both executive and non-executive positions. 
Despite the progress of women in the attainment of such positions, they are still rare in the 
boards of industrialized and advanced economies such as the UK. 36% of the firms have at 
least one female executive director. However, the highest number of female executive directors 
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among the firms in the sample is 2. However, non-executive directors are more common among 
the FTSE 100 boards with firms having up to 6 women non-executive directors. 
The sample includes 132 firms and 1016 observations. The number of observations drops 
to 882 when computing the OIG and Growth as these are growth variables computed as the 
yearly percentage change. The mean and the median for both the control and the dependent 
variables are reasonably close. The low representation of female directors is illustrated in Table 
1 through the descriptive statistics of the various gender dummy variables. The median and the 
mean for the variable Non-Executives are the highest compared to the rest of the gender 
variables. This suggests that the sample comprises more female non-executive directors relative 
to the other studied positions. As expected, the descriptive statistics exhibit the low 
representation of female executive directors. The median for the all executive gender variables 
is null.  
In order to avoid spurious outliers, the accounting variables are winsorized at the top and 
bottom 1% in line with Faccio et al. (2016) among others.   
The correlation matrix is computed to prevent multicollinearity between the variables 
which might induce spurious results. Reported in Appendix B, the matrix does not show a high 
correlation between two variables that might result in multicollinearity. The only exception is 
the correlation between FirmSize and BoardSize of the order of 0.52 which is still below the 
rule of thumb of 0.7 as outlined by Brooks (2008). The performance variables as well as the 




Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Observations
CEO 0.035 0 0.185 0 1 1016
CEO/CFO 0.058 0 0.235 0 1 1016
CFO 0 .029 0 0.170 0 1 1016
Executives 0.177 0 0.382 0 1 1016
Non-Executives 0.866 1 0.341 1 0 1016
3Non-Executives 0.262 0 0.440 0 1 1016
ROE 0.123  0.135 0.100 -0.227 0.320 1016
ROA 0.057 0 .053 0.055 -0.106 0.208 1016
OI/TA 0.082 0 .078 0.073 -0.118 0.292 1016
Growth 0.040 0 .043 0.097 -0.192 0.219 882
OIG 0.006 0.034 0.360 -0.942 0.856 882
Leverage 0.183 0.175 0.128 0.001 0.482 1016
DED 0.359 0 .350 0.138 0.104 0.649 1016
BoardSize 11.13 11 2.565 5 21 1016
FirmSize 9.528 9.121 1.797 4.877 14.69 1016
FirmAge 2.982 2.944 0.962 0.693 4.875 956
Tangibility 0.234 0 .142 0.224 0,001 0.715 1016
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics   
This table displays the summary statistics for the variables used throughout the analysis. The displayed 
statistics are: the mean, median, the standard deviation (SD), the minimum (Min) and the maximum 





4. Regression Models  
Following the literature, the regression model used is a Fixed Effect Ordinary Least 
Square model with robust standard errors in order control for serial correlation and 
heteroskedasticity (Faccio et al. 2016; Adams 2016). The choice of the fixed effects model is 
motivated by its property to account for firms’ fixed effects in order to mitigate the issue of 
endogeneity. In fact, this model allows controlling for the unobservable firm characteristics that 
might bias the results (Adams, 2016). In order to validate the choice of the fixed effects model, 
the Hausmann test is applied to choose between the random effects and the fixed effects 
models. The null hypothesis of the test is rejected pointing the suitability of the fixed effects 
model. 
Two types of dependent variables are used to proxy for risk and performance distinctively 
as illustrated by equation (1) and (2).  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝐴𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (1) 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑂𝐼𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2) 
The regression represented by equation (1) is run with three distinct proxies 
for 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖,𝑡: ROA, ROE and OI/TA. ROA is the return on assets, ROE is the return on 
equity and OI/TA is the operating income divided by the total assets. 
In equation (2) the dependent variable 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘𝑖,𝑡 is DED calculated as the ratio of total long term 
debt to total long term debt plus total equity. OIG represents the operating income Growth that 
is used as a control variable in equation (2).  
In both equation (1) and (2) 𝑋𝑖,𝑡 represents the variables that control for firms’ characteristics: 
Growth is the yearly percentage change in total asset, FirmSize is the natural logarithm of total 
assets, FirmAge is computed as the natural logarithm of 1 plus the years since incorporation of 
firms, Tangibility is computed as the ratio of fixed to total assets and, BoardSize is the number 
of board members. 
In both equations,  𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 are dummy variables representing gender diversity on boards. To 
account for women impact as executive directors, 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 takes the value of the dummies 
CEO, CEO/CFO, Executives. To account for women representation on the board of 
independent directors the variable 𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 takes the value of the variables Non-Executives 
and 3Non-Executives. Appendix C details the regression models. 
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5. Endogeneity  
When investigating the impact of gender on the corporate risk and performance, issues of 
endogeneity arise. In econometric terms, endogeneity arises when the independent variable of 
interest is correlated with the error term in the regression. Two main drivers of endogeneity are: 
unobservable factors and reverse causality (Adams, 2016).  In fact, the heterogeneity in firms’ 
characteristics, complexity and lifecycle is likely to bias the results. That is why control 
variables such as the firm age and size are included in the regressions. However, some other 
characteristics cannot be measured and included as control variables. Some instances are firms’ 
and directors’ characteristics that are omitted or simply immeasurable resulting in the omitted 
variable bias. This bias is addressed by relying on the fixed effects regression consistent with 
the literature on gender diversity. The culture of the corporations is an instance of the omitted 
variable bias. The firm fixed effects model demeans the variables to account for such time 
invariant effects (Adams, 2016).  
However, there are also factors that vary over time for all firms. To control for time 
effects, the regression model introduces year dummies. This allows accounting for economy 
wide fluctuations in line with Liu et al. (2014). Time fixed effects could be tax regulations and 
changes that affect all firms in the same year. Controlling for this effect is a further attempt to 
mitigate endogeneity issues. 
Another highly debated concern is the reverse causality. It is unclear whether the female 
CEO joined an originally profitable or risky firm. A number of studies suggest that women tend 
to join good performing firms that have low risk. These include Farrell and Hersch (2005), who 
explain this theory by the external pressures for board diversity combined with the rarity of 
women directors. On the opposite stream, some studies report that women are most likely to be 
appointed to leadership positions in risky firms and in times of financial distress. This theory is 
commonly referred to as the glass cliff phenomenon (Ryan and Haslam, 2005). Therefore, the 
control variables, the firm fixed effects model and the year dummies do not suffice to address 
potential endogeneity issues. To mitigate the problems associated with causality and 
simultaneity, the independent variables are lagged by one period. This technique mitigates 
reverse causality issues. Moreover, the effect of women directorship takes time to reflect on the 
corporate performance and risk. Regressing women representation at the same period might not 
be the best way to assess their impact. Therefore, lagging the independent variables might be 
more suitable. This technique is borrowed from Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Carter et al. 
24 
 
(2010). In a more recent study Borghesi et al. (2016) use this technique to mitigate endogeneity 
issues. However, this is not enough to address reverse causality; in fact, another method is the 
instrumental variable technique. More about the instrumental technique and its use in the 
literature is discussed in the Limitations and Future Research section. 
IV. Results 
1. Female Directors & Corporate Performance  
1.1. Fixed Effects OLS Regressions 
Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 report the regression results of the OLS fixed effects model 
with robust standard errors including year dummies to control for time fixed effects. The 
performance measures ROE, ROA and OI/TA are regressed on the gender variables while 
controlling for selected firm characteristics and the size of the board of directors. Table 2 and 
Table 3 report results for the CEO and the executive directors respectively. Table 4 reports the 
results associated with the non-executive directors. 
In Table 2, the gender variable CEO is positive and statistically significant across all 
three performance measures. The regression models (1) and (3) with ROE and OI/TA as 
dependent variables respectively, show the positive impact of the variable CEO with a 
significance level of 1%. In the regression model (2) the female CEOs’ impact is also 
significant at the 5% level, with the ROA as the dependent variable. These results indicate that 
female CEOs have a positive and significant impact on the performance of the firm measured 
by three different profitability metrics.  
These findings are in line with multiple instances in the literature. Liu et al. (2014) find 
that female CEOs have a positive and significant impact on the corporate performance 
measured by ROA. Khan and Vieito (2013) and Peni (2014) find that female CEOs are 
associated to higher ROAs. Smith et al. (2006) also find that female CEOs have a strong 
positive impact on corporate performance measured by OI/TA profitability metric. Dezső and 
Ross (2008) also document female CEOs’ positive impact on firms’ ROA and ROE. Studies 
such as the Catalyst (2005) assert the positive impact of women CEOs on the ROE among other 
performance measures.  
The positive impact of women CEOs on corporate performance could be explained by a 
variety of factors. Peni (2014) attributes this finding to women’s devotion in this leadership 
role that is usually particularly hard for them to reach. Only women who demonstrate “special 
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talent” would be able to reach such positions as a consequence of the glass ceiling (Peni, 2014). 
In line with this reasoning, Krishnan and Park (2005) suggest that the barriers faced by women 
equip them for the various challenges of the top management positions. Moreover, Krishnan 
and Park (2005) supplement this reasoning by the unique cognitive and emotional skills that 
characterize female leaders. In fact, women’s success as top managers is often associated to 
their feminine managerial attributes that include collaboration, teamwork and innovation 
(Dezső and Ross, 2008; Glass and Cook, 2015). The positive impact realized on the corporate 
performance reflects the benefits of diversity within the firm. It also shows that beyond the 
gender stereotypes and the “think manager, think male” perspective, female leaders could be a 






CEO 0.066*** 0.019** 0.037***
(0.021) (0.009) (0.010)
Leverage -0.254*** -0.172*** -0.193***
(0.075) (0.046) (0.047)
Growth 0.243*** 0.107*** 0.105***
(0.048) (0.026) (0.029)
BoardSize 0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
FirmSize -0.015 -0.023** -0.035***
(0.020) (0.009) (0.011)
FirmAge 0.022 0.001 0.010
(0.030) (0.017) (0.019)
Tangibility -0.070 -0.045* -0.056
(0.053) (0.026) (0.052)
Constant 0.221 0.287*** 0.435***
(0.221) (0.085) (0.108)
No. of observations 839 839 839
Number of firms 132 132 132
R-squared 0.170 0.184 0.200
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Table 2: Fixed Effects Regression: Corporate Performance & the CEO 
This table presents the results of the fixed effects regression following the Performance model. 
Three dependent variables are used to proxy for performance. ROE is the net income over the 
total equity. ROA is the net income over total assets. OI/TA is the operating income divided by 
the total assets. The gender variable CEO is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the CEO is a 
woman. Independent variables are introduced to control for firms’ characteristics. Leverage is 
the total long-term debt divided by the total assets. Growth is the yearly percentage change in 
total assets. BoardSize represents the size of the board. FirmSize is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed to total assets. The regression is performed with 
robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% 



















In Table 3, the same regression models are replicated in order to investigate the effect of 
two other gender variables. The first variable is CEO/CFO that indicates the presence of a 
woman CEO or CFO. The coefficient of the CEO/CFO gender variable is significant with the 
ROE performance measure at the 5% level as shown in regression (1). This implies that women 
CFOs and CEOs have a positive impact on the return on equity of the firms. The Executives 
variable indicates the presence of a female executive director and is positive and significant 
with the ROE performance metric at the 10% level in regression (2). These findings suggest 
that women are more likely to have a positive impact on the corporate performance when they 
are the CEOs. The significant impact that CEO/CFO and Executives dummies have on the 
corporate performance metric finds substantial support in the literature (Krishnan et Park, 2005; 
Francoeur et al., 2008; Perryman et al. 2016; Smith et al., 2006). Francoeur et al. (2008) find 
consistent results using the same metric ROE.  
However, the absence of the female executives’ impact across the regressions with ROA 
and OI/TA suggests that women in executive positions other than CEO will not necessarily 
influence the corporate performance. To explain this finding, one can suggest that women can 
be considered as tokens in any executive position excluding the CEO as they represent a 
minority in the directors’ team. In fact, in a male dominated executive board, the participation 
of female directors might not result in a significant impact. The maximum number of women in 
the executive team is 2 in the studied sample; thus, another hypothesis could be that women 
might only have an impact when they reach a critical mass (Kristie, 2011; Liu et al. 2014). 
Moreover, the executive directors in this sample hold different roles ranging from Chief 
Operating Officers to Human Resources Directors. Thus, one can also hypothesize that women 
directors are more likely to have an impact when they are appointed to executive positions that 
are more crucial to the strategy of the company (CEO). In sum, the impact of women in 
executive positions other than the CEO is not consistent throughout the regression models. 
Therefore, this study cannot firmly conclude that female executive directors other than CEOs 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO/CFO 0.034** 0.005 0.006
(0.017) (0.007) (0.0117)
Executives 0.022* 0.004 0.004
(0.013) (0.006) (0.008)
Leverage -0.263*** -0.261*** -0.174*** -0.173*** -0.196*** -0.196***
(0.074) (0.076) (0.045) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Growth 0.241*** 0.239*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.106***
(0.048) (0.047) (0.026) (0.026) (0.030) (0.029)
BoardSize 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
FirmSize -0.014 -0.012 -0.023** -0.023** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.0110)
FirmAge 0.019 0.015 -0.001 -0.002 0.006 0.004
(0.031) (0.031) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Tangibility -0.066 -0.056 -0.044* -0.046* -0.054 -0.055
(0.053) (0.053) (0.026) (0.026) (0.053) (0.053)
Constant 0.225 0.221 0.291*** 0.296*** 0.444*** 0.450***
(0.223) (0.227) (0.086) (0.085) (0.109) (0.108)
No. of observations 839 839 839 839 839 839
Number of firms 132 132 132 132 132 132
R-squared 0.167 0.165 0.182 0.182 0.192 0.192
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 3: Fixed Effects Regression: Corporate Performance & the Executive Directors 
This table presents the results of the fixed effects regression following the Performance model. Three 
dependent variables are used to proxy for performance. ROE is the net income over the total equity. ROA is the 
net income over total assets. OI/TA is the operating income divided by the total assets. Two gender variables 
are used: The first is CEO/CFO is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the CEO or the CFO is a woman; the 
second is Executives is another dummy that takes the value 1 if there is at least one female executive director 
on board. Independent variables are introduced to control for firms’ characteristics. Leverage is the total long-
term debt divided by the total assets. Growth is the yearly percentage change in total assets. BoardSize 
represents the size of the board. FirmSize is the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed 
to total assets. The regression is performed with robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. ***, **, * 




In Table 4, the same regression models are replicated to uncover the impact of women 
non-executive directors. The first dummy variable Non-Executives indicates the presence of at 
least one female non-executive director. The Second dummy variable 3Non-Executives 
indicates the presence of at least three female non-executive directors. Both variables are not 
significant across the three regression models. These results are in line with Liu et al. (2014) 
who find that the subsample of women executives reports significant results as opposed to the 
independent or non-executive directors. Smith et al. (2006) also found significant results for the 
female CEOs and mixed results when it comes to the rest of women on boards. In fact, the 
authors report that while women CEOs have a significant positive impact, results for the 
remaining board members are not consistently significant and exhibit both positive and 
negative coefficients. Randøy et al. (2006) and Rose (2007) do not report any significant 
relationship between boards’ gender diversity and corporate performance. Although the 
presence of women non-executive directors did not appear to be significant in this sample, this 
does not refute the potential benefits of their representation on boards. These results contradict 
the findings of Erhardt et al. (2003) and Liu et al. (2014) among others. Gender diversity 
among board members is often reported to enhance the corporate governance and female 
independent directors are reported to have better attendance rates and to engage more actively 
in the boards’ meetings (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Therefore, whether boards’ gender 
diversity benefits reflect on the corporate performance measures or not; a gender mix is more 
likely to bring value than a male or a female dominated team. In fact, having different 
perspectives would enrich the inputs during the corporate decision making process. This is 
characterized in the literature by the social identity theory that links diversity in groups to the 





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-Executives 0.010 -0.001 -0.001
(0.017) (0.008) (0.003)
3Non-Executives 0.011 0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.005) (0.006)
Leverage -0.259*** -0.263*** -0.174*** -0.175*** -0.196*** -0.197***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Growth 0.244*** 0.246*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.106***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030)
BoardSize 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
FirmSize -0.012 -0.012 -0.023** -0.022** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
FirmAge 0.012 0.011 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Tangibility -0.066 -0.058 -0.044* -0.041 -0.055 -0.050
(0.054) (0.054) (0.026) (0.026) (0.053) (0.052)
Constant 0.228 0.236 0.293*** 0.290*** 0.449*** 0.444***
(0.223) (0.223) (0.088) (0.087) (0.111) (0.110)
Observations 839 839 839 839 839 839
Number of firms 132 132 132 132 132 132
R-squared 0.162 0.163 0.181 0.182 0.192 0.193
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 4: Fixed Effects Regression: Corporate Performance & the Non-Executive Directors 
This table presents the results of the fixed effects regression following the Performance model. Three 
dependent variables are used to proxy for performance. ROE is the net income over the total equity. ROA is the 
net income over total assets. OI/TA is the operating income divided by the total assets. Two gender variables 
are used: The first is Non-Executives is a dummy that takes the value 1 if there is at least one female non-
executive director; the second is 3Non-Executives another dummy that takes the value 1 if there is at least three 
female non-executive directors on board. Independent variables are introduced to control for firms’ 
characteristics. Leverage is the total long-term debt divided by the total assets. Growth is the yearly percentage 
change in total assets. BoardSize represents the size of the board. FirmSize is the natural logarithm of total 
assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed to total assets. The regression is performed with robust standard errors 





In Table 2, Table 3 and Table 4 the control variables show consistent effects throughout 
the regressions. The coefficient of the Leverage variable is negative and statistically significant 
across all three performance models consistent with Liu et al. (2014) findings. This suggests 
that leverage impacts negatively the financial performance of companies. 
The FirmSize control variable has a significant negative impact on two of the profitability 
measures in line with the findings of Guest (2009) who reports a strong negative association 
between the size and the profitability of firms. However, the Growth variable holds a positive 
and significant coefficient across the three performance models. This suggests growth 
opportunities are associated to profitability. The Tangibility control variable, defined as the 
portion of long term assets dived by the total assets, shows a significant negative impact on 
performance when measured by the variable ROA.  
1.2. Robustness Tests 
Table 5, Table 6 and Table 7 report the results of the fixed effects OLS regressions with 
firm and time fixed effects. To test for robustness, the independent variables are lagged by one 
period. The rationale behind lagging the variables is considering that the impact of women 
directors takes time to occur. Carter et al. (2010) lag all independent variables by one period 
using an OLS fixed effects regression. The authors state that the number of lags that should be 
used before observing an impact remains an empirical question. This method is also in line with 
Farrell and Hersch (2005) and Borghesi et al. (2016). 
The results in Table 5 report the impact of women CEOs on the corporate performance 
with lagged independent variables. These results suggest even higher positive coefficients for 
the CEO gender variable. In fact the CEO variable exhibits a strong positive impact that is 
significant at the 1% level across models (1) and (3) regressing the ROE and OI/TA.  This 
impact is also positive and significant at the 10% level in the ROA regression represented by 
model (3). This robustness exercise reported in Table 5 asserts the positive impact of female 
CEOs on the firm performance measured by three profitability metrics. The regression results 
are still consistent and statistically significant even after controlling for firm and time effects 
with lagged independent variables. In sum, female CEOs appear to have a positive impact on 
corporate performance upon the robustness checks.   
However, the positive impact arising from women representation in the top management 
team vanishes when the independent variables are lagged, as reported in Table 6. Neither the 
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CEO/CFO nor the Executives gender variables show significant results across the three 
performance measures. The only exception can be seen in model (1) with the ROE performance 
metric, where the Executives gender dummy exhibits a positive coefficient that is significant at 
the 1%. This table supports the lack of evidence of the executive directors’ impact on corporate 
performance. These results further confirm that women in top management are more likely to 
have an impact when they are the CEOs. 
Lagging the independent variables in Table 7 does not introduce any noticeable 
difference for the non-executive directors’ regressions results. The coefficients for the gender 
variables remain insignificant. Women non-executive directors do not seem to have an impact 
on corporate performance consistent with the base case results. Using alternative measures to 
proxy for non-executive directors’ presence in unreported regressions, exhibits similar results. 
These measures include the percentage of non-executive directors from the total board, and the 
presence of at least two female non-executive directors. 
Finally, across the tables 5 and 6 and 7, the impact of firms’ characteristics remains 
consistent but less significant after checking for robustness. The Growth variable is still 
significant at the 5% and 10% levels across the all the regressions. However, the lagged 
Leverage variable loses significance in all the models. This suggests that the performance of 
firms is better explained with the leverage in the same period. However, with a single period 
lag, FirmSize seems to have a stronger negative impact that is significant across all models in 
Table 5 and Table 6.   
In sum, upon replication of the regressions with one year lag in the independent variables, 
most results prove to be robust. However, the executive team other than the CEO does not 
show a persistent impact on the corporate performance. The non-executive directors’ impact 





Lagged variables (1) (2) (3)
CEO 0.105*** 0.032* 0.057***
(0.040) (0.017) (0.014)
Leverage -0.039 -0.028 0.027
(0.080) (0.037) (0.044)
Growth 0.093** 0.040** 0.040*
(0.040) (0.019) (0.022)
BoardSize 0.002 0.001 -0.001
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
FirmSize -0.071*** -0.041*** -0.044***
(0.021) (0.011) (0.013)
FirmAge 0.025 0.016 0.029
(0.031) (0.019) (0.021)
Tangibility -0.129** -0.083*** -0.090*
(0.063) (0.030) (0.047)
Constant 0.766*** 0.420*** 0.466***
(0.214) (0.094) (0.119)
No. of observations 682 682 682
Number of firms 115 115 115
R-squared 0.139 0.151 0.158
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES
Table 5: Robustness Test: Corporate Performance & the CEO 
This table presents the results using lagged independent variables. Following the Performance 
model, a fixed effects OLS regression is used. Three dependent variables are used to proxy for 
performance. ROE is the net income over the total equity. ROA is the net income over total 
assets. OI/TA is the operating income divided by the total assets. The gender variable CEO is a 
dummy that takes the value 1 if the CEO is a woman. Other Independent variables are introduced 
to control for firms’ characteristics. Leverage is the total long-term debt divided by the total 
assets. Growth is the yearly percentage change in total assets. BoardSize represents the size of 
the board. FirmSize is the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed to 
total assets. The regression is performed with robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. 




Lagged Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
CEO/CFO 0.042 0.011 0.017
(0.027) (0.010) (0.0130)
Executives 0.038*** 0.007 0.007
(0.014) (0.006) (0.008)
Leverage -0.045 0.085** -0.030 0.0370* 0.024 0.038*
(0.080) (0.040) (0.037) (0.019) (0.044) (0.023)
Growth 0.090** -0.048 0.038* -0.030 0.038* 0.024
(0.041) (0.082) (0.019) (0.037) (0.022) (0.045)
BoardSize 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
FirmSize -0.071*** -0.068*** -0.040*** -0.040*** -0.044*** -0.043***
(0.021) (0.020) (0.011) (0.0116) (0.014) (0.014)
FirmAge -0.003 0.011 0.013 0.0119 0.022 0.020
(0.042) (0.033) (0.020) (0.0198) (0.022) (0.022)
Tangibility -0.121* -0.117* -0.083*** -0.081*** -0.088* -0.088*
(0.065) (0.067) (0.030) (0.031) (0.047) (0.046)
Constant 0.852*** 0.793*** 0.426*** 0.429*** 0.477*** 0.482***
(0.235) (0.207) (0.095) (0.096) (0.121) (0.122)
No. of observations 688 688 688 682 688 688
Number of firms 115 115 115 115 115 115
R-squared 0.127 0.137 0.146 0.147 0.147 0.145
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 6: Robustness Test: Corporate Performance & the Executive Directors 
This table presents the results using lagged independent variables. Following the Performance model, a fixed 
effects OLS regression is used. Three dependent variables are used to proxy for performance. ROE is the net 
income over the total equity. ROA is the net income over total assets. OI/TA is the operating income divided 
by the total assets. Two gender variables are used: The first is CEO/CFO is a dummy that takes the value 1 if 
the CEO or the CFO is a woman; the second is Executives is another dummy that takes the value 1 if there is 
at least one female executive director on board. Independent variables are introduced to control for firms’ 
characteristics. Leverage is the total long-term debt divided by the total assets. Growth is the yearly 
percentage change in total assets. BoardSize represents the size of the board. FirmSize is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed to total assets. The regression is performed with 






Lagged Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Non-Executives 0.010 -0.001 -0.001
(0.017) (0.008) (0.003)
3Non-Executives 0.011 0.004 0.005
(0.010) (0.005) (0.006)
Leverage -0.259*** -0.263*** -0.174*** -0.175*** -0.196*** -0.197***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.046) (0.046) (0.047) (0.047)
Growth 0.244*** 0.246*** 0.107*** 0.108*** 0.105*** 0.106***
(0.048) (0.048) (0.027) (0.026) (0.030) (0.030)
BoardSize 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001)
FirmSize -0.012 -0.012 -0.023** -0.022** -0.034*** -0.034***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.001) (0.011) (0.011)
FirmAge 0.012 0.011 -0.002 -0.002 0.004 0.005
(0.032) (0.032) (0.017) (0.017) (0.020) (0.020)
Tangibility -0.066 -0.058 -0.044* -0.041 -0.055 -0.050
(0.054) (0.054) (0.026) (0.026) (0.053) (0.052)
Constant 0.228 0.236 0.293*** 0.290*** 0.449*** 0.444***
(0.223) (0.223) (0.088) (0.087) (0.111) (0.110)
Observations 839 839 839 839 839 839
Number of firms 132 132 132 132 132 132
R-squared 0.162 0.163 0.181 0.182 0.192 0.193
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 7: Robustness Test: Corporate Performance & the Non-Executive Directors 
This table presents the results using lagged independent variables. Following the Performance model, a fixed 
effects OLS regression is used. Three dependent variables are used to proxy for performance. ROE is the net 
income over the total equity. ROA is the net income over total assets. OI/TA is the operating income divided by 
the total assets. Two gender variables are used: The first is Non-Executives is a dummy that takes the value 1 if 
there is at least one female non-executive director; the second is 3Non-Executives another dummy that takes 
the value 1 if there are at least three female non-executive directors on board. Independent variables are 
introduced to control for firms’ characteristics. Leverage is the total long-term debt divided by the total assets. 
Growth is the yearly percentage change in total assets. BoardSize represents the size of the board. FirmSize is 
the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed to total assets. The regression is performed 






2. Female Directors & Corporate Risk  
2.1. Fixed Effects OLS Regression  
Table 8 reports the results of the OLS fixed effects regressions with robust standard 
errors including year dummies to control for time fixed effects. The leverage ratio DED is 
regressed on the gender variables while controlling for selected firms’ characteristics and the 
size of the board of directors.  
Women CEOs and CFOs seem to decrease firms’ risk as measured by the ratio of long-
term debt over equity plus long-term debt. Therefore, an additional variable CFO is included to 
study the isolated impact of women CFOs which also proves to be negative and statistically 
significant at the 5%. These results suggest that women at key executive positions may 
contribute to a decrease in firm leverage. However, the variable Executives does not appear to 
be significant. Women at certain positions in the executive team are not directly involved with 
the financing decisions of the firm; therefore, their presence might not necessarily decrease the 
risk of the corporations. As outlined in the previous section, positions such as Chief Operating 
Officers and Human Resources would not necessarily allow for an observable impact on firm’s 
leverage. 
The findings in this section suggest that women executive directors are inversely related 
to leverage. This is in line with Faccio et al. (2016) who use the same measure for corporate 
risk (DED) and find that female CEOs reduce leverage.  
Multiple studies also find consistent results (Frank and Goyal, 2007; Cole, 2013; Huang 
and Kisgen, 2013; Levi et al., 2014; Perryman et al., 2016).  Frank and Goyal (2007) find that 
firms are less likely to issue debt when the CEO is a female. Huang and Kisgen (2013) show 
that female CEOs and CFOs are more conservative. Perryman et al. (2016) and Hutchisnon et 
al. (2015) find consistent results regarding the presence of women executives. 
 The most common and “available” explanation for these results is the stereotypical 
female risk aversion. This gender stereotype finds support in sociological, psychological, and 
empirical studies. Such stereotypes should be analyzed with caution as they would necessarily 
influence the appointment of women directors (Mohan, 2014). In fact, it is misleading to 
generalize the level of risk aversion to the whole gender population. Women are found to have 
different risk propensities but still exhibit the same performance level as their male 
counterparts (Atkinson et al., 2003). Women are found to be more risk loving than their male 
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counterparts (Adams and Funk, 2012). Female directors in the financial industry are found to 
have different risk propensities than female directors in other industries (Sapienza et al., 2009). 
This study investigates the impact of women CEOs and executive directors in aggregate terms 
as team members. This reasoning is in line with Perryman et al. (2016) who confirm that 
diversity among firms’ executive teams results in less corporate risk and a better corporate 
performance. Female CEOs and female executive directors might adopt more prudent risk 
strategies than their male counterparts; however, for their strategy to reflect on corporate risk 
metrics, they need to persuade the remaining executive directors before adopting it (Perryman 
et al., 2016).  
 Women in the non-executive team do not seem to have an impact on corporate risk. The 
results are in line with many findings in the literature (Matsa and Miller, 2013; Adams and 
Ragunathan, 2015; Sila et al., 2016). Matsa and Miller (2013) find no change in Norwegian 
firms’ leverage after the introduction of the 40% quota for women participation on boards. 
Adams and Ragunathan (2015) find no evidence of corporate risk reduction when examining 
the presence of women on boards. Sila et al. (2016) investigate the relationship between the 
presence of women on boards and the equity risk and find no gender-related differences. These 
results suggest that the gender composition among non-executive teams does not necessarily 
influence corporate risk. The interpretation of the obtained results can also be linked to the low 
representation of women on boards. Once again, women represent a minority on boards; in fact, 
they are part of a male dominated team. Thus, they may be subject to tokenism especially given 
the rarity of women sitting on the boards of the studied sample. However, even the 3Non-
Executives variables following the critical mass theory did not appear to be significant. This 
could be due to the low frequency of the existence of 3 female non-executive directors. Another 
possible reasoning would question the extent to which the non-executive board has an impact 
on corporate risk. Given that non-executive directors are not involved in day to day managerial 
operations, they can only reduce risk through their monitoring role. Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
suggest that the impact of gender diversity among boards on non-executive directors depends 
on the internal corporate governance systems. The strength of the internal corporate governance 
system is a primary condition to achieve corporate risk reduction. Only when this condition is 
fulfilled that one can draw conclusions about the effect of gender diversity on boards’ 
monitoring. More characteristics about the boards’ meetings and involvement in the corporate 
decisions should be used as control variables in the regressions. This could improve the 
accuracy of the analysis. 
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Among the control variables, only the Tangibility and the FirmSize exhibit coefficients 
that are statistically significant at the 1% and 10% levels respectively. These variables appear 


















OIG 0.001 0.001 -0.023 -0.001 0.000 -0.001
(0.0111) (0.011) (0.046) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Growth -0.024 -0.021 0.001 -0.019 -0.024 -0.022
(0.045) (0.045) (0.011) (0.046) (0.045) (0.046)
BoardSize -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006*
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
FirmSize 0.055*** 0.054*** 0.053*** 0.0521** 0.052** 0.054***
(0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
FirmAge -0.038 -0.036 -0.026 -0.029 -0.027 -0.025
(0.041) (0.040) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Tangibility 0.160* 0.156* 0.153* 0.145* 0.157* 0.163*
(0.085) (0.085) (0.085) (0.086) (0.086) (0.085)
Constant -0.047 -0.049 -0.068 -0.048 -0.034 -0.075
(0.211) (0.210) (0.214) (0.217) (0.216) (0.214)
No. of observations 839 839 839 839 839 839
Number of firms 132 132 132 132 132 132
R-squared 0.062 0.062 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.056
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 8: Fixed Effects Regression - Corporate Risk & Female Directors 
This table presents the results of the fixed effects regression following the Risk model. The dependent 
variable DED is the ratio of debt plus equity divided by the total long-term debt. CEO is a dummy that 
indicates the presence of a female CEO. CEO/CFO is a dummy that indicates the presence of a female 
CFO or CEO. CFO indicates the presence of a female CFO. Executives indicates the presence of at least 
one female executive director. Non-Executives is a dummy that indicates the presence of at least one 
female non-executive director and 3Non-Executives indicates the presence of at least three female non-
executive directors. OIG is the yearly percentage change of the operating income. Growth is the yearly 
percentage change in total assets. BoardSize represents the size of the board. FirmSize is the natural 
logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed to total assets. The regression is performed with 






2.2. Robustness Tests  
Table 9 presents OLS regressions with firm and year fixed effects with all the 
independent variables being lagged by one period. The rationale behind lagging the variables is 
allowing the impact of women directors to occur through time. Carter et al. (2010) lag all 
independent variables by one period using an OLS fixed effects regression and controlling for 
time fixed effects. The authors state that the number of lags that should be used before 
observing an impact remains an empirical question. This method is also in line with Farrell and 
Hersch (2005) and Borghesi et al. (2016). 
After the performance of robustness checks, the significance of the coefficients of the 
gender variables marginally decreases. However, both the joint and isolated impact of CEOs 
and CFOs on firms’ risk remain negative and statistically significant. This confirms that women 
CEOs and CFOs decrease firms’ leverage. The impact of women representation in the 
executive team once again shows to be discriminatory: only CEOs and CFOs appear to 
decrease risk. The impact of the presence in the remaining executive position is not significant.  
The variable Non-Executives turns significant at the 10% level. This translates into some 
evidence that female independent directors might reduce risk measured by the DED 
independent variable. The second dummy 3Non-Executives remains statistically insignificant. 
This may be due to the rarity of the presence of three non-executive female directors in the 
sample. The potential inverse relationship between women non-executive directors and risk 
finds some support in the literature (Carter et al., 2014). The two main arguments are: risk 
aversion and tough monitoring (Croson and Gneezy, 2009; Adams, 2009). 
The control variables coefficients are consistent with the base case results. The lagged 
Tangibility variable is significant at the 1% level with a positive coefficient. However, the 


















OIG 0,001 0.001 -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.001
(0.012) (0.012) (0.051) (0.053) (0.012) (0.013)
Leverage -0.00926 -0.006 -0.001 -0.002 -0.008 -0.005
(0.0515) (0.051) (0.012) (0.012) (0.051) (0.052)
BoardSize -0.00277 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004
(0.00431) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
FirmSize 0.058** 0.060** 0.057** 0.056** 0.053* 0.058**
(0.027) (0.026) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
FirnAge -0.032 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 -0.027 -0.022
(0.053) (0.060) (0.052) (0.053) (0.053) (0.054)
Tangibility 0.267*** 0.259*** 0.263*** 0.260*** 0.265*** 0.278***
(0.086) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083) (0.084) (0.083)
Constant -0.150 -0.189 -0.168 -0.164 -0.010 -0.173
(0.331) (0.343) (0.329) (0.334) (0.330) (0.330)
No. of observations 688 688 688 688 688 688
Number of firms 177 117 115 117 115 115
R-squared 0.066 0.068 0.065 0.065 0.068 0.065
Firm fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 9: Robustness tests – Corporate Risk & Female Directors 
This table presents the results using lagged independent variables. Following the Risk model, a fixed effects 
OLS regression is used. The dependent variable DED is the ratio of debt plus equity divided by the total 
long-term debt. CEO is a dummy that indicates the presence of a female CEO. CEO/CFO is a dummy that 
indicates the presence of a female CFO or CEO. CFO indicates the presence of a female CFO. Executives 
indicates the presence of at least one female executive director. Non-Executives is a dummy that indicates the 
presence of at least one female non-executive director and 3Non-Executives indicates the presence of at least 
three female non-executive directors. OIG is the yearly percentage change of the operating income. Growth 
is the yearly percentage change in total assets. BoardSize represents the size of the board. FirmSize is the 
natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed to total assets. The regression is performed 



















An additional robustness test is performed: controlling for industry effects. In fact, 
instances in the literature assert that women in the financial sector are not as risk averse as 
women in other industries (Sapienza et al., 2009). Other authors find evidence that women are 
more risk loving than their male counterparts in the financial industry (Adams and Funk, 2012; 
Adams and Ragunathan, 2014). Berger et al. (2014) is among the exceptions in the literature 
who find that find women directors are related to an increase in corporate risk. Their findings 
also reside in the banking context. One alternative could be to exclude the financial companies; 
however, this results in a substantial reduction in the number of observations. This study opts 
for controlling for industry effects. The model used throughout the analysis is the fixed effects 
model given that the Hausmann test provided a p-value of 0.000 which points the suitability of 
the fixed effects model. However, the nature of this model does not allow controlling for time 
invariant variables such as industry dummies. Therefore, industry dummies are introduced in a 
random effects linear regression model. The results of the random effects OLS regressions with 
industry and year effects are consistent with the base case results. Among the used gender 
variables, only CEO and CEO/CFO prove to be significantly negatively related to Leverage. 
This robustness test suggests that women CEOs and CFOs reduce corporate leverage regardless 
of the industry. The results of the random effect tests are presented in Table 10. 
This section relies on two methods to test the sensitivity of the impact of women directors 
the on corporate risk. Overall, the results suggest that women CEOs and CFOs might reduce 
corporate leverage. However, when it comes to the impact of the remaining members of the 


















OIG -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.005
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.011)
Growth 0.001 0.003 0.000 0.005 -0.002 0.001
(0.042) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.041) (0.042)
BoardSize -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
FirmSize 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.0021 0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
FirmAge 0.001 0.001 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Tangibility 0.036 0.034 0.031 0.030 0.030 0.033
(0.048) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)
Constant 0.301*** 0.301*** 0.296*** 0.295*** 0.298*** 0.301***
(0.094) (0.093) (0.093) (0.093) (0.095) (0.095)
No. of observations 839 839 839 839 839 839
Number of firms 132 132 132 132 132 132
R-squared 0.066  0.064 0.642 0.070 0.070 0.070 
Firm fixed effects NO NO NO NO NO NO
Year fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Industry fixed effects YES YES YES YES YES YES
Table 10: Robustness tests – Corporate Risk & Female Directors 
This table presents the results of a random effects OLS model with years and industry dummies. The 
dependent variable DED is the ratio of debt plus equity divided by the total long-term debt. CEO is a 
dummy that indicates the presence of a female CEO. CEO/CFO is a dummy that indicates the 
presence of a female CFO or CEO. CFO indicates the presence of a female CFO. Executives 
indicates the presence of at least one female executive director. Non-Executives is a dummy that 
indicates the presence of at least one female non-executive director and 3Non-Executives indicates 
the presence of at least three female non-executive directors. OIG is the yearly percentage change of 
the operating income. Growth is the yearly percentage change in total assets. BoardSize represents 
the size of the board. FirmSize is the natural logarithm of total assets. Tangibility is the ratio of fixed 
to total assets. The regression is performed with robust standard errors displayed in parentheses. 
***, **, * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance level respectively. 
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V. Discussion  
Women CEOs seem to have a strong positive impact on corporate performance measured 
by three different metrics. Moreover, both female CEOs and CFOs are found to be negatively 
associated to corporate leverage. Evidence of the potential positive impact of female executives 
other than the CEOs is also apparent throughout the regressions; however, its significance 
decreases upon the robustness checks. Female executive directors in this sample hold different 
roles ranging from Chief Operating Officers to Human Resources directors; therefore, one can 
conclude that women are more influential as CEOs than in other executive positions. In fact, 
CEOs enjoy the highest rank in the company. The CEO position allows access to strategic 
information and control over the key decisions of the firm. Moreover, the maximum number of 
women in the executive team is 2 in the studied sample; thus, another hypothesis could be that 
women might only have an impact once they reach a critical mass (Kristie, 2011; Liu et al. 
2014).  
Women on boards as non-executive directors do not seem to have an impact on corporate 
performance and risk. One can attribute the absence of their impact to tokenism. The theory of 
tokenism was used in the late nineties to describe minorities such as female directors who 
represent a particular demographic group (Kanter, 1977). A Token is an individual who is 
judged based on stereotypes rather than managerial performance (Kanter, 1977; Liu et al. 
2014). Following this reasoning, one can argue that few women present in a board might not 
often succeed to voice their opinions in the decision making process. Moreover, as opposed to 
CEOs and executives, independent board members are not involved in the day to day 
managerial decision making. Therefore, boards of non-executive directors meet less frequently 
than top managers which might hinder the impact of diversity in their corporate decision 
making process. Consistent with this reasoning, Adams and Ferreira (2009) suggest that the 
impact of gender diversity among boards of non-executive directors depends on the internal 
corporate governance systems. Accounting for the frequency of boards’ meetings and their 
involvement in the decision making could help controlling for the strength of the internal 
corporate governance systems.  
In sum, this thesis stresses the benefits of gender diversity on corporate boards. Female 
directors are part of a larger team of executives with whom corporate decision making is 
shared; therefore, their positive impact could be attributed to the benefits of diversity. In line 
with Post and Byron (2014) and Perryman et al. (2016) among others, this study stresses the 
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benefits of having different perspectives as a result of gender diversity. Women leadership 
style, although not necessarily universal, might also bring an added value to the corporations. 
Krishnan and Park (2005) assert the unique cognitive and emotional skills that characterize 
female leaders. In fact, women’s success as top managers is often associated to their feminine 
managerial attributes that include collaboration, teamwork and innovation (Dezső and Ross, 
2008; Glass and Cook, 2015).  
VI. Limitations and Future Research  
Despite being comprehensive by looking at both risk and performance and differentiating 
between the executive and non-executive positions, this thesis has a number of limitations. 
Results are drawn from the largest UK corporations. Therefore, they might not be 
representative of small companies and non-western cultures. The size of the sample and the 
unbalanced nature of the panel data represent a further limitation in this study. This sample also 
suffers from the low representation of female executives which decreases the accuracy of the 
results. 
From an econometrical viewpoint, lagging the independent variables to mitigate 
endogeneity issues does not suffice to account for reverse causality. Moreover, this technique 
resulted in a substantial reduction in the number of observations which weakened the 
regression models. A common approach to address endogeneity is the instrumental variable 
method. However, finding an instrument to examine gender differences in corporate settings is 
consensually an incredible challenge. Therefore, more research should be done in order to 
facilitate the identification of suitable instruments in this context. Two common instrumental 
variables are used in the academic articles within this emerging literature. The first is a variable 
based on a state gender equality index applicable to only US companies. The second is based 
on the fraction of male directors who sit on gender diverse boards both in the sample firms and 
outside the studied sample. However, information about male directors is not provided in the 
Cranfield reports from which gender data is retrieved in this study. Given that the first variable 
is non-applicable and the second is inaccessible, this study fails to use the instrumental variable 
technique.  
Moreover, subjective measures based on market value such as the Tobin’s Q, would 
complement this study. As the accounting based measures that are used are commonly 
criticized as being an input of the corporation, they are subject to reporting biases. 
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The regressions in this study do not control for individual characteristics of the directors 
such as the age and education. In fact, these characteristics might make a difference in the 
performance and risk propensity of the directors. In addition to the observable characteristics, 
exploring deep-level diversity is suggested by Torchia et al., (2011) as an alternative to better 
assess the dynamics of the boards’ composition. Deep-level diversity is the unobserved 
diversity among team members such as personality, background and skills (Milliken and 
Martins, 1996). Proxies for deep-level characteristics are challenging yet not impossible to 
identify making it an interesting area for future research. 
Future research might also tackle the persistent wage gap between male and female 
directors. Observing whether this gap is tightened with an increase in diversity is a promising 
research area. In fact, if female leaders receive lower compensation holding the same position 
than their male counterparts, this might result in low self-esteem which would in turn affect 
their performance. Finally, rather than focusing on female impact on corporate outcomes, 
future research should direct efforts towards studying the impact of gender diversity on the 
team dynamics. As the corporate decision making process is the product of teams of directors 
and board members, accounting for the degree of minorities’ participation in this process may 
shed more light on the impact of their inclusion as directors. Surveys and case studies might be 
more suitable to explore this research area. 
VII. Conclusion  
Are women the superheroes of the corporate world? The impact of gender diversity on 
corporate outcomes has brought an overwhelming literature with contradictory findings. In fact, 
conclusions and results vary from one study to another, and the opposite would be surprising. 
The inconsistency in the published findings is only a proof that universal truths do not fit in 
studies that measure complex variables such as gender-diversity. The results in this study do 
not allow for definitive conclusions as they do not entirely control for endogeneity issues. 
Nevertheless, this study provides evidence that female CEOs enhance corporate performance 
and decrease firms’ risk. Women in executive positions also seem to have a positive impact on 
firms’ outcomes. However, this study does not claim that women reduce risk and produce 
better corporate outcomes. The results rather suggest that diversity should be welcomed within 
the corporate decision making bodies.  
Although some might be superheroes, not all women are the same. Moreover, their 
impact is conditioned by the nature and the extent of their involvement in the corporate 
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decision making among other factors. Therefore, if women are not treated as equal board 
members, their representation is unlikely to have an impact. This study suggests that the 
corporations and other institutions should help women breaking through the glass ceiling. Their 
help should start at the very first touch-points of socialization such as the educational 
institutions. Schools and universities should help break the stereotypes of “think manager-think 
male.” This implies motivating women to access leadership positions and to challenge gender 
stereotypes that might constitute a barrier to their appointment as executive directors.  
Finally, female managers are continuously climbing to senior positions; therefore, this 
study makes a contribution to a relevant contemporary topic in corporate finance. Further 
research on female representation in corporate directorship would benefit both the firms and 
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CEO A dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the CEO is a woman, 0 otherwise
CEO/CFO A dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the CEO or the CFO is a woman and 0 otherwise
CFO A dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the CFO is a woman and 0 otherwise
Executives A dummy variable that takes the value 1 when the CFO is a woman and 0 otherwise
Non-Executives A dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there is at least one woman non-executive director on board and 0 otherwise
3Non-Executives A dummy variable that takes the value 1 when there are at least three woman non-executive director on board and 0 otherwise
ROE The net income divided by the equity 
ROA The net income divided by the total assets 
OI/TA The operating income divided by the total assets
Growth The growth of the total assets
OIG The yearly pecentage change in the operating income 
Leverage The total long-term debt divided by the total assets
DED The total long-term debt divided by the sum of the total long-term debt and equity
BoardSize The number of directors on board
FirmSize The logarithm of the total assets of the firm
FirmAge Years since incorporation 
Tangibility The fixed assets divided by the total assets
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16
1.  CEO 1
2.  CEO/CFO 0.765 1
3.  Executives 0.426 0.536  1
4.  Non-Exec 0.075 0.098  0.176 1
5.  3Non-Executives 0.169 0.201  0.320  0.229  1
6.  ROE 0.014 0.015  0.047  0.054  0.033  1
7.  ROA 0.011 0.019 -0.031  0.007  0.028  0.637  1
8.  OITA -0.007 -0.015 -0.043 -0.021  0.021  0.557  0.827  1
9.  DED -0.041 -0.010 -0.017  0.056  0.051  0.063  0.007  0.017  1
10.  DA -0.085 -0.054 -0.018  0.005 -0.020 -0.028  0.044  0.070  0.122  1
11. OIG -0.024 -0.019 -0.008  0.082  0.028  0.292  0.255  0.267  0.009 -0.066 1
12. AG 0.011 0.023  0.060 -0.102 -0.072  0.251  0.191  0.158 -0.003 -0.027  0.162 1
13. BoardSize -0.047 -0.037  0.035  0.254  0.275  0.006 -0.104 -0.123  0.039 -0.082 -0.016 0.024 1
14. FirmSize -0.031 -0.041  0.005  0.127  0.212 -0.114 -0.381 -0.394 -0.000 -0.312 -0.118 -0.034 0.525 1
15. FirmAge -0.111 -0.049  0.030  0.127  0.086 -0.005 -0.025 -0.011  0.075 -0.027 -0.026 -0.030 0.087 0.146 1
16. Tangibility 0.004 -0.000 -0.027 -0.066 -0.068 -0.044  0.136  0.202 -0.079  0.251 -0.010 0.026 -0.115 -0.199 0.122 1
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Dependent Variable Independent Variable Control Variables
Performance
ROE = Gender + Leverage + Growth + BoardSize + FirmSize + FirmAge + Tangibility + ε
ROA = Gender + Leverage + Growth + BoardSize + FirmSize + FirmAge + Tangibility + ε
OI/TA = Gender + Leverage + Growth + BoardSize + FirmSize + FirmAge + Tangibility + ε
Risk
DED = Gender + OIG        + Growth + BoardSize + FirmSize + FirmAge + Tangibility + ε
Appendix C: The Regression Models for Corporate Performance and Corporate Risk 
 
 
 
